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Abstract 
 
Tender vessels in the United States will soon need to comply with new safety 
regulations as mandated by the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010. This thesis 
focuses specifically on assisting in the formation of an Alternative Safety Compliance 
Program (ASCP) for the unique tender vessel fleet and seeks to understand why tender 
vessels experience fatalities and vessel casualties. By analyzing data of tendermen 
fatalities and tender vessel casualties between 2000 and 2012, this report sheds light on 
the realities of these incidents. Among other findings, the data show that the most 
common cause of vessel casualty was striking rocks or the ocean floor, and most 
common human error was falling asleep at the helm. This thesis then proposes potential 
regulations that would be economically feasible and realistic for tenders by comparing 
the casualty data to the reported financial realities of current tender vessels. Notably, the 
analysis indicates that applying the current Alternative Compliance and Safety 
Agreement (ACSA) to tenders would not be beneficial. Ultimately, the proposed 
regulations herein should act as a foundation for a discussion regarding an alternative 
compliance agreement, as the final agreement will be reached through a much greater 
dialogue between many involved parties, including tendermen, regulators, safety 
compliance experts, and others.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The Goal of This Thesis 
 This report seeks to understand why tender vessels, and the lives of those on 
board, are lost in the 17th Coast Guard district. By working with tender operators, crews, 
the United States Coast Guard, and other experts in the field of vessel safety and 
procedures, this report analyzes recent data related to tender incidents and proposes 
reasonable and effective regulation to mitigate future losses aboard these vessels. While 
previous reports have thoroughly detailed cumulative vessel losses and worker casualties 
in both the United States at large and Alaska specifically, this will be the first report to 
focus exclusively on tender vessels, which is critically important to understand when 
creating new safety regulations that will affect the Alaskan tender fleet.  
Tenders constitute a specific fleet of vessels that do not directly catch fish but 
instead act as a buying agent for seafood companies, purchasing, refrigerating, and 
transporting fish from the fishing vessels to the shore processing plants or floating 
processing vessels (hereafter referred to as “processors”). Tenders therefore have 
important differences from other fishing fleets, and the regulations they must comply 
with should be tailored to those differences. Just as an oil tanker and recreational ski boat 
have obvious distinctions, there are less obvious, but just as important, differences 
throughout commercial fishing fleets. Consequently, for a regulation to be effective, it 
needs to focus on the reality of the specific fleet’s challenges. This report will therefore 
shed light on the difficulties faced by tender vessels to help direct regulation that will be 
in accordance with their needs.  
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1.2 The Alaskan Fishing Business – Money and Jobs 
The fishing industry in Alaska is an extremely lucrative and successful business. 
In 2011, a study completed by the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute estimated the 
direct and secondary economic impacts of the industry on the United States’ economy to 
be $15.7 billion. The combined value of Alaskan seafood exports and the retail value of 
those exports was estimated at $6.4 billion, $2.8 billion of which went directly to the 
employees involved in the business (McDowell Group, 2013). The Alaskan commercial 
fishing industry includes wild catches of Pacific salmon, Pacific halibut, Pacific cod, 
groundfish such as rockfish and sole, sablefish, herring, four species of shrimp, sea 
cucumbers, sea urchins, and pollock, plus 64 aquatic farms with oysters, littleneck clams, 
and geoduck clams (McDowell Group, 2013). 
The commercial salmon fisheries are the most valuable type of fishing by far, 
accounting for nearly half of the entire economic value. Bristol Bay, off the southwest 
coast of Alaska, also has the largest sockeye salmon fishery in the world, which alone 
accounts for close to 100 million fish annually. While the pollock, Pacific cod, and other 
groundfish and flatfish account for the greatest wholesale economic impact, at about 
$2.88 billion in 2011, the salmon fishery has a higher multiplier because of the secondary 
effects in the Alaskan economy. The salmon fishery’s wholesale value is about $2.45 
billion. In 2011, Alaska hauled in 56 percent of the total U.S. commercial fishery harvest 
by volume, or 36 percent by value (McDowell Group, 2013). 
 The fishing industry is also the largest private employer in the state of Alaska. 
Overall, this means that one in seven Alaskans is employed because of Alaskan seafood, 
and in 2011, the industry directly created 63,100 jobs in the state. When viewed more 
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broadly, the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute’s report estimated that the industry 
provides 165,800 American jobs, including 34,000 jobs for Washington state residents as 
well as thousands of jobs for hatchery managers, restaurateurs, grocers, and distributors 
throughout the nation (McDowell Group, 2013).  
 The Alaskan fishery business is quite impressive on the global scale as well. 
Somewhat surprisingly, about two-thirds of Alaskan seafood is exported around the 
world (McDowell Group, 2013), with Japan receiving the largest percentage of imports 
(Johnson & Byers, 2003). Only 10 percent of the U.S. seafood supply originates in 
Alaska, and wild Alaskan salmon only accounts for about 23 percent of the total U.S. 
salmon supply (McDowell Group, 2013). While the United States may not directly 
consume the products of Alaska’s waters, the state of Alaska and the United States at 
large reap the economic and employment benefits of these waters.  
With these impressive, profitable numbers, the Alaska commercial fishing 
industry may seem highly susceptible to overzealous fishermen and eager businessmen, 
and at one point in Alaska’s history, it was. Between the 1940s and 70s, the Alaskan 
salmon population was at the brink of extinction, mostly due to overfishing. However, 
state legislation that limited the number of fishing permits per year and increased focus 
on habitat protection and hatchery production helped salmon populations rebound to 
record levels (Johnson & Byers, 2003).  
Today, the entire industry is regarded as one of the most sustainable fishery 
endeavors in the world. According to the most recent report by the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, none of the Alaskan salmon or groundfish species are classified as 
overfished. For more than three decades, Alaskan salmon harvests have increased beyond 
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historical levels, and the Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch lists Alaska salmon 
as the only salmon to earn a “Best”1 rating. Further, no species of Alaskan seafood has 
ever been listed as endangered under the United States’ Endangered Species Act (Alaska 
Seafood Marketing Institute, n.d.). 
To protect this haven for both fish and fishermen alike, each year the major 
fisheries are managed by state and federal agencies which look to scientists and experts to 
calculate sustainable harvests and set limits on total allowable catches. Some catches, 
such as salmon, herring, and particular crab species, are regulated by the state of Alaska, 
while federal entities regulate catches such as pollock, cod, halibut, and Bering Sea crab. 
Once scientists in these organizations establish the catch volumes for the year, catch 
volumes are allocated in order to best divide the available resources. By combining the 
knowledge of fishermen, scientists, policy advisors, and government officials, Alaskan 
seafood can be sustained for generations to come. The success and perpetuation of fishing 
in Alaska therefore seems to be an economically, politically, and environmentally 
profitable enterprise to pursue.   
 
1.3 The Industry’s Hurdles  
 While the Alaskan commercial fishery industry is both lucrative and sustainable, 
it also presents unique and momentous challenges. The United States Coast Guard 
recently published a comprehensive review of lost American fishing vessels and crew 
1 A “Best” rating is defined as a seafood that is “abundant, well-managed and caught or farmed in 
environmentally friendly ways” (Monterey Bay Aquarium Foundation, 2014). 
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fatalities throughout the entire nation.2 Between 1992 and 2010, a total of 2,072 vessels 
were lost, and 1,055 fatalities occurred in United States waters. Alaskan waters had the 
highest death rate, with 239 individual deaths, or 22 percent of the total. They also 
accounted for the largest proportion of vessels lost, with a total of 479 vessel casualties, 
or 26 percent of the total vessels lost. Comparatively, the Eighth Coast Guard district, 
which includes Texas and a large part of the Gulf of Mexico, accounted for the second 
highest number of vessel casualties, at 365 vessels, as well as the second highest number 
of worker deaths, at 200 individuals (Dickey, 2011).  
As one of the most hazardous professions in the United States, Alaska 
commercial fisheries collectively have a death rate that is 26 times higher than the 
average for all U.S. workers (Lincoln & Lucas, 2010). Between 1991 and 1996, there 
were a total of 146 deaths in the Alaska fishing industry, equivalent to 140/100,000 full-
time employees. Comparatively, for all workers in the United States, the annual fatality 
rate during this time was 4.4/100,000 workers (Thomas, Lincoln, Husberg, & Conway, 
2001). Throughout the year, the shellfish industry accounted for 46 percent of these 
injuries, while in the summer months of July and August salmon fishing operations 
accounted for 61 percent of the injuries (Dickey, 2011). Since the early 1990s, specific 
efforts have helped reduce fatalities by 42 percent, yet between 2000 and 2010 there was 
still an average of 46 deaths per year, which equates to 124 deaths per 100,000 workers 
(Dickey).  
Loss of life is clearly a serious and prevalent threat aboard commercial fishing 
boats in the United States. Yet mistakes and mishaps at sea are also often fiscally 
2 This report did not make distinctions between fishing and tender vessels. Therefore, we cannot reach 
conclusions on the death rates of workers on tenders from the reports in this section.  
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expensive. Capsizing, fires, and explosions can and have occurred on fishing boats, and 
all have potentially deadly and expensive consequences. As previously stated, the U.S. 
Coast Guard determined that 479 fishing vessels were lost between 1992 and 2007 in 
Alaska, including 58 vessels in the last 5 years of the study (Dickey, 2011). In this study, 
the most common cause of vessel loss was flooding, accounting for 36 percent of total 
losses. Fires and grounding (or the ship running ashore) were the second and third most 
likely causes of vessel loss, accounting for 20 and 16 percent of causes, respectively 
(Dickey, 2011). 
These losses are expensive, too. Another analysis, prepared for the United States 
Coast Guard in 1997, estimated that the annual property, injury, clean up, and associated 
costs of accidents on marine vessels to be almost $531 million annually. Notably, the 
costs associated with U.S. commercial fishing vessel accidents were more than three 
times greater than the costs of tanker accidents (Marco, Frederick, & Thomas, 1997). 
But the commercial fishing industry need not be plagued with vessel loss and 
worker casualties forever. The 1997 analysis ultimately concluded that implementing 
accident prevention programs that focused on both preventing technological failure and 
human error could save between $190.5 million and $317.5 million annually (Marco, et 
al. 1997). Already, the fatalities in Alaskan waters have declined significantly, likely due 
in part to a task force implemented in 1999 aimed at reducing vessel loss. The U.S. Coast 
Guard’s 2011 analysis concluded that simple measures, such as training workers for 
emergencies and using proper personal flotation devices and life rafts, could save many 
lives, as water exposure caused more than three-quarters of all fatalities. Additionally in 
this study, the Coast Guard found that only 10 percent of the individuals who died 
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because of vessel loss were using a personal flotation device (PFD) or survival suit when 
they entered the water, but fishermen survive more than twice as often when survival 
equipment is properly used (Dickey, 2011).  
Ultimately, there are obvious improvements that need to be made to protect 
employees who participate in this fast-paced and strenuous business. While previous 
data, including the analysis completed by the United States Coast Guard, clearly outlines 
and documents many types of maritime casualties throughout the nation, this report will 
be the first one to identify and document casualties that occur solely on tender vessels in 
Alaska. In this respect, it will shed a new light on the particular issues that plague the 
tender business and propose effective regulation to remedy the issues at hand. Some 
regulation has already been implemented to protect those onboard commercial fishing 
vessels of all types, but this report seeks to examine additional and/or alternative 
regulation to offer new solutions to problems that persist in this rewarding, yet risky, 
profession. 
 
1.4 Alaskan Fishing Operations  
 The process of harvesting seafood is as varied as the fish consumers choose to 
buy. In many fisheries, fish are taken from the sea by vessels such as gillnetters, trawlers, 
seiners, crabbers, and trollers, and are then taken to a shore processing plant or floating 
processing vessel (hereafter referred to as “processors”) on a separate vessel called a 
tender. From the processor, fish are shipped throughout the world, oftentimes to buyers in 
Japan or Seattle. To better understand the fishing business in Alaska, some of the 
different types of vessels, including tenders, are described below. These various vessels 
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seek different types of seafood and occupy various regions of the Pacific Ocean 
throughout the year, but they all operate commercially to catch fish and provide income.  
• Trawlers: These boats tow nets along the bottom of the ocean to scoop up fish 
which are too slow to outswim the net. Catches include pollock and cod. 
• Gillnetters: These vessels put nets in the water and wait for fish to swim by and 
become entangled in the net.  These generally seek fish such as salmon or herring.  
• Setnetters: This type of fishing is similar to gillnetting, but one end of the net is 
tethered to shore while the other end extends up to 1,200 feet offshore. This type of 
fishing concentrates predominantly on salmon.  
• Seiners: These boats drop nets into the water and attempt to surround a school of 
fish. They then close the bottom of the net and trap the fish. These boats 
concentrate efforts on salmon and herring.  
• Trollers: These vessels use bait and hooks to catch salmon on a line while at sea. 
Because of the high quality of fish, these vessels generally produce the most 
expensive catch.  
• Longliners: These vessels drop long lines with many baited hooks into the water 
attached to an anchor. The line is released and tethered to a buoy, and the fish 
become stuck on the hooks. These boats catch halibut, cod, sablefish, and rockfish.  
• Pot Vessels: These vessels place baited pots on the ocean floor. Crabs and cod 
enter these pots but then cannot exit. The pots are later hauled aboard the vessel.  
• Tenders: These vessels do not actively participate in fishing, but instead act as a 
buying agent for seafood companies. They purchase fish from the fishing vessel, 
chill the catch, and transport the fish to the processor and are responsible for 
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ensuring the delivery arrives in good condition. These vessels help increase 
economic and hourly efficiency for both the fishing vessel and processor. They 
mainly operate in the herring and salmon industry, but their operations can include 
cod, crab, sea cucumber, and catches from longline vessels.  Further descriptions 
of the tender vessel’s operations are discussed below.  
 
     Fishermen may also use a variety of fishing techniques throughout the year as the 
fishing seasons change. For example, an individual may fish for sablefish in April, 
herring in May, halibut in June, salmon in July and August, crab in the fall, and 
groundfish in the winter. Other fishermen may choose to fish aggressively for three or 
four months out of the year and pursue other interests or professions the rest of the year 
(Johnson & Byers). As is evident from the above section, pursuing the Alaskan harvest 
involves a wide variety of techniques, boats, and lifestyles.  
While catching fish is the initial step in the Alaskan fishing industry, the fish must 
also be prepared for market at the processor. These vessels and plants take the raw fish 
and generally remove the head and eviscerate, trim, and wash each fish. The degree to 
which the product is prepared varies between processors; some fish are processed and 
frozen, some are canned, some are filleted and fully prepared for cooking or reprocessing, 
while others are packed with gel ice and shipped to restaurants to be served soon after 
they are caught.  
Vessels that do not either process their fish directly or take their catch to a 
processing plant largely rely on tenders to transport fish for them. This allows the fishing 
vessel to stay on the fishing grounds for a longer period of time, thus maximizing their 
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catch and profits. It also enhances processing efficiency at the processing plant or vessel 
because tenders can deliver large volumes of fish in a short amount of time, which allows 
processors to produce more product per hour without wasting time coordinating smaller 
deliveries. Since fishing vessels cannot carry as many fish in one load when compared to 
a tender, the turnover time to wait for fishing vessels to pull up to the processor, dock, 
unload, and leave is quite time consuming and inefficient.  
When a fishing vessel arrives at a tender, the tender uses a large vacuum pump or 
a brailer bag hoisted by booms or cranes to transport fish from the fishing boat into the 
tender. The catch is weighed by a scale, and the fisherman is given a “fish ticket” which 
describes the weight and type of fish, the catch area, and the species of fish (for example, 
sockeye versus coho salmon). This fish ticket essentially acts as cash, and the fishing 
vessel may receive the money promised on the ticket at their earliest convenience.  
On the tender, fish are either placed in slush ice or in refrigerated sea water tanks, 
which can hold upwards of 500,000 pounds of fish. Oftentimes, these boats also assist the 
fishing vessels by bringing supplies to those on the fishing grounds, including items such 
as drinking water and food, and other luxuries such as cold drinks, access to hot showers, 
and ice cream. A tender may unload more than a dozen boats before returning to the 
processor, which then prepares the fish to be sold in the market (Johnson & Byers, 2003). 
Unmistakably, the tender vessel, while not actively fishing, is still an integral part of the 
Alaskan fishing industry.  
 Yet regulating tender vessels presents distinct challenges because of their unique 
place in the industry. Operating a tender is not as profitable as fishing or processing, and 
so owners often do not have large sums of money to invest in their vessel. Unlike other 
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fishing vessels, which are paid for their catch, processors pay the tenders a daily rate for 
their efforts. In this respect, tenders are seen as a business expense to the processor, 
which means that their pay is minimal when compared to a processor or fishing vessel. 
Of the price that consumers pay at retail, about 3 percent of that price goes to tenders, 
while fishermen receive 10 percent, and processors earn 16 percent (Johnson & Byers, 
2003). Even though tenders are guaranteed a somewhat consistent pay rate, they also do 
not experience the windfall profit that comes with a larger catch. Because of this fixed 
income situation, tender vessels are more likely to age and become worn without surplus 
funds that can be invested in maintenance and safety (Duz, 2013). Regulation, therefore, 
must account for a tender vessel’s limited budget.  
Additionally, some other types of vessels, such as crabbers and trawlers, are used 
as tenders during the salmon and herring seasons in order to generate income when they 
are not fishing (Johnson & Byers, 2003). This means that vessels may have to comply 
with two or more sets of regulations while also remaining profitable. Ultimately, tender 
operators and vessels pose unique challenges to the Alaskan fishing industry and safety at 
sea, and it is therefore important that those challenges are understood and met with 
relevant and reasonable regulations.  
 
1.5 Regulation: The Coast Guard, Congress, and More 
1.5.1 The Coast Guard’s Authority and Jurisdiction 
  The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is “authorized to enforce, or assist in the 
enforcement of, all U.S. Federal laws applicable on, over, and under the high seas and 
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waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” (14 U.S.C. § 2). The U.S. Coast 
Guard is therefore able to enforce laws that delegate exclusive power to its organization, 
and it also has the power to act when another Federal agency is referenced in a law. 
Further, the waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction include not only waters in U.S. territory, 
but also waters in which foreign countries have authorized U.S. law enforcement. By 
following and enforcing the laws passed in United States Congress, the USCG is given 
extensive authority to manage United States waterways.   
 The waters of the United States are divided into 9 districts, and each district has 
its own governing Coast Guard body and official headquarters. The state of Alaska makes 
up the 17th district, with its headquarters located in the state’s capital, Juneau. The Pacific 
Northwest is included in the 13th district, with its headquarters located in Seattle. By 
dividing the nation into specific districts, the Coast Guard is better able to focus on 
certain issues that pertain to that area. For example, District 9 includes the Great Lakes 
region, and their responsibilities and areas of focus are much different than those of 
District 14, which is located in Hawaii. Therefore, this study seeks to work directly with 
the 17th and 13th Districts, as forthcoming regulations will predominately affect these 
regions. Undeniably, the USCG plays the central role in enforcing and maintaining laws 
and regulations throughout the United States’ commercial fishing industry, and it is 
therefore important that they perceive the regulations proposed in this report as both 
enforceable and advantageous solutions to prevent tender vessel casualties. 
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1.5.2 Current Laws and Regulations for Commercial Fishing 
Vessels 
 In general, the laws and acts passed by United States Congress are codified in the 
United States Codes (USCs). Executive agencies, such as the United States Coast Guard 
or Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), then carry out these laws 
through the development and enforcement of regulations. Regulations are designed to 
increase efficiency and flexibility of Congressional laws, and they are generally created 
through a process that allows public participation in the construction of regulations that 
will affect the population. Unfortunately, citizens often overlook the opportunity to 
participate in this creation process, yet it is an important step in forming effective, yet 
reasonable, regulations. Agencies such as the USCG are assigned to promulgate 
regulation because of their expertise and depth in a given subject matter. The USCG has 
authority to enforce regulations in portions of Titles 33 and 46.  
Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, delegates regulations in Chapter 1 to 
the USCG while Chapters 2 and 4 are delegated to the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers and 
the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, respectively. In Code of Federal 
Regulation (CFR) 33, the USCG ensures accordance with rules pertaining to vessel 
security, general boating procedures, transfers of hazardous materials, and navigation 
safety regulation, among myriad other topics. Title 46, entitled Shipping, is divided into 4 
chapters, of which the U.S. Coast Guard is to regulate and enforce Chapters 1 and 3 (the 
U.S. Maritime Commission regulates Chapters 2 and 4). These chapters contain rules 
regarding proper vessel certification, general operation techniques, hazardous chemical 
management, safety procedures, and more. Chapter 1, Part 28 of this CFR concerns 
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requirements for the commercial fishing industry in the United States, and thus serves as 
the basis for current regulations in the commercial fishing vessel industry.  
Two major pieces of legislation, the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety 
Act of 1988 and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 resulted in significant 
amendments to Titles 33 and 46, and the United States Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2012 made changes as well. These Acts are the most important 
pieces of legislation affecting safety for the commercial fishing industry in the United 
States today, and they are discussed in greater depth below.   
 
1.5.3 The Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 
(CFIVSA)  
 The Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-424) 
initiated regulation of the commercial fishing industry. This Act took effect in 1992 and 
sought to address the unnecessarily high number of fatalities at sea. These new 
regulations required vessels to carry life saving equipment, survival crafts, distress 
signals, emergency positioning indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs), fire extinguishers, 
emergency alarms, bilge pumps, and more. This Act also developed regulations for 
watertight integrity.  
 The Act was very successful, as worker fatalities declined significantly after its 
implementation (Garofolo, 1997). Notably, two important aspects of this Act helped 
foster its success. First, it established an advisory committee, named the Commercial 
Fishing Industry Vessel Advisory Committee, made up of fishermen, marine-safety 
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representatives, safety equipment vendors, and other experts to help set safety regulations 
and recommend measures to the Coast Guard. Fishermen and policy-makers alike 
favored this advisory board, as it helped guide effective, yet efficient, regulatory 
standards. Second, the voluntary dockside examination program was also a key 
component to fostering this Act’s success (Garofolo). This program allowed fishermen to 
request a free, no-fault examination by the Coast Guard to ensure their vessel’s 
compliance with the law. These safety checks were extremely helpful in allowing 
fishermen to get recommendations for improvements without fear of punishment.  
This Act also broadened the USCG’s authority. It gave the Coast Guard 
permission to complete safety checks at sea and to prevent vessels from operating if they 
are not in compliance, helping to further enforce safety measures mandated by the Act. 
The combination of no-fault, no-cost safety checks and the threat of enforcement action 
helped enhance vessel safety and decrease lives lost in commercial fishing operations 
(Garofolo).  
A study completed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) found that between 1991 and 1999 the survival rates of workers in vessel 
capsizing and sinking events steadily increased from a 77 percent survival rate between 
1991 and 1993 to a 94 percent survival rate between 1997 and 1999 (Lincoln & Lucas, 
2010). This data suggests that CFIVSA helped reduce worker fatalities when vessels sink 
or capsize. However, while this Act improved the safety of many boats, there were still 
many vessels classified as “uninspected,” which meant regular safety compliance 
examinations were not mandatory. Additional legislation addressed these issues to further 
enhance vessel safety.  
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1.5.4 The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010  
 The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-281), signed by President 
Obama on October 15, 2010, sought to address the persistent hazards in the commercial 
fishing industry and improve upon the legislation in CFIVSA (United States Coast 
Guard, 2013). This Act amended USC 46, required new safety protocols and equipment, 
made significant changes to the sections regarding load lines and uninspected fishing 
vessels, and further defined the requirements for the Alternative Safety Compliance 
Program (discussed in greater detail below). 
 This Act required many new safety protocols. Instead of requiring simply a 
“lifeboat or liferaft” as previously outlined in CFIVSA, all vessels that operate beyond 3 
nautical miles are now required to carry “a survival craft that ensures that no part of an 
individual is immersed in water” (46 U.S.C. § 4502(b)(2)(B)). Also, to improve overall 
vessel safety, individuals in charge of vessels that operate beyond 3 nautical miles must 
complete a training program every 5 years that includes topics such as fire fighting, 
emergency drills, navigation, seamanship, stability, and more.  
 Other regulations in this Act apply directly to vessel construction and 
maintenance. Vessels operating beyond 3 nautical miles are now required to complete a 
dockside safety check every 2 years and carry certification documents on board, whereas 
CFIVSA did not mandate such safety checks (the voluntary exams are still encouraged 
for vessels that operate closer to shore). The Act also amended the section in Title 46 
regarding load lines (the point at which the hull of the boat meets the water), making the 
load line requirement mandatory for all vessels 79 feet long or greater and built after July 
1, 2012 (Determining a Vessels Load Line Length, 2013). Additionally, alternative load 
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line requirements for vessels that do not meet these specifications must also be formed 
through cooperation between the fishing and regulatory factions. 
 The classification system for vessels has also increased in scope to include not 
only processors but also fishing and tender vessels. This classification system is 
essentially a series of safety checks and regulations outlined by the American Bureau of 
Shipping and completed by the Coast Guard to ensure seaworthiness. Vessels that are at 
least 50 feet in length, were built after July 1, 2013, and operate beyond 3 nautical miles 
from shore are now required to comply. Fishing vessels, fish processors, and fish tenders 
that do not meet the requirements for the classification system are required to comply 
with an Alternative Safety Compliance Program  (ASCP) to be written by the fishing 
industry and regulatory agencies by January 1, 2017 and implemented by July 1, 2020. 
The tender vessels that must comply with this program must participate in Aleutian trade 
and fall into one of the following categories:  
 
1) A vessel that is at least 50 feet in length, built before July 1, 2013, and is 25 
years of age or older (in or after 2020), or 
2) A vessel that is built before July 1, 2013 that undergoes a “substantial change 
to the dimension of or type of vessel completed after the later of July 1, 2013, 
or the date established by the Secretary” (46 U.S.C.§4503(d)). 
 
If an owner operates 30 or more vessels that are mentioned in (1), they may enter 
a compliance agreement effective January 1, 2030. This alternative compliance 
agreement is an important program for understanding this thesis, and the details and 
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reasons for this legislation are discussed in Section 1.5.6 on page 19. There is currently 
one similar agreement in place, and the tender fleet in the United States will adopt 
another, adapted compliance agreement as mandated by this Act.   
The Authorization Act of 2010 will likely improve vessel safety in commercial 
fishing fleets in the future due to the enhanced safety requirements and new classification 
system. Yet this thesis seeks to understand why tenders specifically experience casualties, 
with the ultimate goal of proposing effective regulations for this particular fleet. 
 
1.5.5 The United States Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2012  
 President Obama signed the United States Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-213) on December 20, 2012. The changes this Act 
made to Title 46 were not as significant as CFIVSA or the Authorization Act of 2010, but 
are important for understanding current regulation nonetheless. This Act changed 
dockside examination policy for relevant vessels by requiring checks every 5 years 
instead of every 2. The examinations are also required for vessels built after July 1, 2013, 
rather than July 1, 2012 as previously mentioned. Other changes in this Act leave the 
Alaska fishing industry largely unaffected.  
 
1.5.6 Alternative Safety Compliance Programs (ASCPs)  
 Federal regulation of the commercial fishing industry is, undoubtedly, more 
stringent for newer and larger vessels. To avoid the burden of more stringent regulation, 
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many fishermen delay purchasing new boats and instead choose to run older, generally 
less-safe vessels, which leads to more vessel and worker casualties. Maintenance costs 
can also be very high on sea-going vessels, so fishermen may also decrease the amount of 
processing or fishing they do in order to continue operating as vessels under less 
regulation. Yet while this may be cost-effective for individual boats, these vessels are 
much more prone to casualties and fatalities. In Dickey’s (2010) study on vessel 
casualties between 1991 and 2010, vessels were more likely to capsize and lead to 
casualties the older they were, and to combat these issues a number of Alternative Safety 
Compliance Programs (ASCPs) are in development as required by the Authorization Act 
of 2010.   
 There is one similar safety agreement currently developed, called an Alternative 
Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA), and it applies to three different 
catcher/processor (C/P) sectors: the non-pollock freezer trawler, the cod freezer longline, 
and the pot cod sector. These vessels both catch and process fish, but there are 
restrictions on the amount of processing a vessel may carry out under this program. For 
example, a vessel in this program may remove the head, guts, and tail of the fish and also 
process stomachs, cheeks, and roe. However, they are not allowed to fillet or process the 
bones or belly flaps. These types of processing actions would classify the vessel as fully 
classed and loadlined, which would create more costly regulation for the owner. This 
program was first established by the United States Coast Guard in 2006 and last revised 
in December of 2012.  
To create agreeable regulatory standards for all parties involved, the Coast Guard 
worked closely with C/P stakeholders and arrived at the current, evolving ACSA. While 
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the full agreement and guidelines are quite lengthy, the main priorities of this Alternative 
Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA) are highlighted below and divided into 11 
subsections. These 11 inspection standards may serve as the starting point for future 
regulation in the tender fleet and may be modified, augmented, and reduced as the data 
prove necessary.  
• Vessel Stability: To ensure that the vessel is stable at sea, the boat must have 
watertight bulkheads and closures, and the sea valves, automatic closure devices, 
and sump pumps must be examined for integrity.  
• Drydock and Internal Structural Exams: The propeller, stern bushing, sea 
connections, weldments, shell plating, sea chest, sea strainers, emergency bilge 
suction, internal spaces, anchors, chains, and wires are inspected.  
• Hull Thickness and Gauging: Gauges must be on sections in the midship, 
saltwater peak tanks, main deck plating, sea chests, and others.  
• Tail Shaft and Rudder Exams: The tail shaft and rudders are analyzed to ensure 
that they are within the manufacturers specifications and that corrosion and wear 
are at a minimum.  
• Watertight and Weathertight Integrity: High water alarms must be installed and 
audible, door coamings are installed when necessary, and the vessel must have 
watertight doors, hatches, and bulkheads.  
• Machinery Systems: Fuel systems must be made of specific materials, and gauges 
on the tanks must be welded to standards. The fire safety hazards must be 
identified, relief valves tested, and certain parts on the vessel must be fire 
resistant, among other things.  
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• Life Saving Equipment and Arrangements: Life rafts must be approved under 46 
CFR and one person must be able to launch them. Ladders must be installed for 
embarkation, and immersion suits must be maintained to manufacturer’s 
specifications and fitted with a strobe.  
• Fixed Fire Fighting Equipment and Arrangements: There must be fixed 
firefighting systems in certain places on the vessel, and fire extinguishers must be 
stored in specific areas, depending on the circumstances.  
• Other Fire Fighting and Safety Equipment: The vessel must carry portable 
dewatering pumps and proper firefighting attire. Certain crewmembers must be 
trained in fire fighting. A safety plan must be used in case of emergencies, and 
Freon and halon detection systems must be used.  
• Emergency Drills and Training: Drills must be conducted by a trained individual 
for disasters such as fire, flooding, abandon ship, and person overboard. Records 
of these drills must be kept.  
• Emergency Communication and Navigation: Automated Identification System 
(AIS) and Global Maritime Distress Signal System (GMDSS) must be installed 
and operable.  
 
After the vessel passes inspection, the Officer in Charge of Marine Inspections 
(OCMI) may grant exemptions to regulation, and the vessel owner must carry a copy of 
the exemption letter aboard the vessel. These safety checks must be performed 
periodically (usually every two years) in order to maintain status under the ACSA 
(United States Coast Guard, 2012).  
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 The Alternative Safety Compliance Programs mandated under 46 USC 4503 by 
the Authorization Act of 2010 have not yet been implemented. However, the Coast 
Guard, in partnership with stakeholders and experts, is currently working toward the 
creation of mutually agreeable programs for different commercial fleets. The programs 
seek to be specific to each fleet, taking into account the difficulties encountered by 
different vessels. Thus, this report seeks to provide direction for the development of an 
ASCP for tenders in the United States. By examining the C/P’s current, evolving ACSA 
and its potential effectiveness and feasibility for tenders in light of their past accidents, 
this report seeks to propose solutions that will effectively address problems that persist on 
uninspected tender vessels at sea.  
  
1.5.7 Other Means of Safety Enforcement  
 While the USCG plays an instrumental role in ensuring vessel and worker safety 
through regulation and enforcement of federal laws, there are also other means of 
improving vessel safety. The USCG can require vessels in certain geographical areas to 
follow alternative regulation (in addition to the ASCPs discussed above), and other 
governing bodies, such as the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) and the Alaska Scallop Association, can suggest safety measures or create 
protocols within specific industries.  
The halibut derby system is a prime example of how simply altering fishing 
regulations can save many lives. Before 1995, halibut fishing in Alaska was operated on a 
“derby” system, wherein fishermen were allocated 24-hour periods in which to catch as 
many fish as possible. The dates of the derbies were established months before the day of 
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fishing and were not flexible to adjust for harsh weather conditions. Between the years of 
1991 and 1994, there were 6 fatal events on commercial halibut vessels (Thomas & 
Conway, 1999). 
However, in 1995, regulatory bodies implemented individual fishing quotas 
(IFQs) for halibut and sablefish, which allocated individual catch limits to each vessel. 
The fishermen were then allowed 8 months in which to fill their quota. This allowed 
fishermen greater flexibility of their hours, and it gave operators the ability to adjust their 
schedule based on weather conditions (Thomas & Conway). Since this change, there have 
not been any deaths on commercial halibut vessels. While this exact modification may 
not be feasible in the tender business, this example proves that sometimes a change in 
operational practices may help reduce accidents, too. 
Similar changes in the crabbing industry have also helped alleviate workplace 
hazards. Overloading crabbing vessels with pots has, historically, created many dangers 
for the crabbing fleet and has caused vessels to capsize unnecessarily. However, some 
safety measures have helped mitigate these risks. In 1999, the USCG initiated the At the 
Dock Stability and Safety Compliance Check (SSCC) in the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands 
(BSAI), which required preseason dock examinations to ensure that fishermen will not 
overload their vessel. Also, in 2005, many of the BSAI crabbing fleets implemented 
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) in a new “crab rationalization” program to alleviate 
issues that arise in a derby fishing system (Fina, 2004). This system is similar to that of 
the halibut regulation, and has also contributed to safety aboard crabbing vessels in 
Alaskan waters. These two changes in regulation, the USCG preseason dockside checks, 
and the crab rationalization program, have helped decrease the average annual fatality 
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rate of employees in this industry by 60 percent. Between 1990 and 1999 there were an 
average of 8 deaths per year, and between 2000 and 2010 there was an average of less 
than 1 death per year. Further, of the 8 individuals who died between 2000 and 2010, 3 
fell overboard, and 5 were lost from a capsizing event. The only vessel to capsize during 
this period did not complete the SSCC (Woodley, Lincoln, & Medlicott, 2009). 
Other organizations, such as the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) have also developed technology and recommended policy to ensure that 
workers are protected at sea. Recently, NIOSH developed an emergency stop device that 
can be retrofitted to any winch, which helps deactivate a winch in case of personnel 
entanglement. NIOSH has also introduced a hatch and door monitoring system that 
prevents flooding on vessels. This system has been tested in the Bering Sea and is in the 
process of being licensed for the market (Lincoln & Lucas, 2013).  
 Lastly, associations within the fishing industry can, and have, helped reduce 
vessel casualties. As previously mentioned, falls overboard without flotation devices 
(especially in Alaskan waters) are one of the leading causes of fatalities. To address this 
problem, the Alaska Scallop Association and individual vessels in the crabbing industry 
recently established a 100 percent personal flotation device (PFD) policy for all crew on 
deck. By educating crews and requiring all crewmembers to wear PFDs, leaders in the 
development and implementation of this policy hope to reduce casualties due to 
individuals falling overboard.  
 The previous examples make clear that there are multiple ways to reduce vessel 
and worker casualties at sea. It is also important to note that the most effective 
regulations often involve a collaboration of entities to combine expertise. Therefore, 
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understanding the dynamics between regulators and other interested parties will likely be 
the most effective way to create effective change in the tender industry.  
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Chapter 2: Methods 
 
This report analyzes data of tender vessel casualties between the years 2000 and 
2012 in the 17th Coast Guard District. When an accident or casualty occurs aboard a 
vessel in the commercial fishing industry, the owner is required by law to file a report 
with the USCG documenting the incident. The Coast Guard then records and stores the 
report, and oftentimes other federal organizations, such as NIOSH, have an agreement by 
which they may access the data and complete analyses. Due to privacy laws, the original 
data was not available for purposes of this study, but the NIOSH Alaska Pacific Office 
generously processed the data and removed its distinctive features so that it could be used 
in this report. The data of personnel fatalities encompasses the full 12-year time span 
from 2000 to 2012, while the vessel casualty data only analyzes events between 2000 and 
2009. In the fall of 2013, the data for non-fatal tender events between 2009 and 2012 had 
not yet been processed by NIOSH, and it was therefore unavailable for the purposes of 
this study. 
The Alaska Independent Tendermans Association (AITA) also provided valuable, 
important information for this report. Thirty-two current tendermen from across Alaska 
filled out a questionnaire regarding their operations, expenses, vessels, and more. Leaders 
at AITA then compiled these reports, removed distinctive features (so that the data may 
remain anonymous), and then granted access to the data to enhance the scope and breadth 
of this report. This made it easier to propose economically reasonable regulations. 
Conversations with many other experts in the fields of occupational safety and 
health, Coast Guard regulations, and fishing operations helped enhance understanding 
throughout this report. Amy Duz, founder and CEO of iWorkWise, helped brainstorm 
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potential regulations for the Discussion chapter, and she also provided general guidance 
for the direction of this thesis. Visits to multiple tender vessels at port in Bellingham, 
Washington and discussions of potential regulation and safety issues proved to be useful 
in broadening the scope of this report as well.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Fatal Events  
Between 2000 and 2012, the NIOSH Alaska Pacific Office (APO) reported that 
there were 3 fatal events on tender vessels. These deaths occurred on separate vessels and 
were a result of three different causes. Overall, the vessels had an average year-built of 
1971, an average crew size of 3, and an average length of 81 feet. All vessels were made 
of steel, two vessels were tendering salmon, and one was not tendering fish at the time of 
the fatality (Table 1).   
One death occurred because the individual asphyxiated due to Freon™ exposure.  
Another death occurred when an individual fell from the dock, intoxicated by 
alcohol.  
The third death (not in temporal order) occurred because a vessel was overloaded 
(Table 1).  
Table 1. A description of all fatal events and vessels involved in fatal events on tender vessels ≥ 50 feet in 
length between 2000 and 2012 in the 17th Coast Guard District. Based on data from the NIOSH APO. 
 Vessel Description Average Range 
Length (feet) 81 60  -  108 
Crew Size 3 2 - 4 
Year Built 1971 1962 - 1979 
Types 
Salmon tender and not fishing 
at the time   
Vessel Hull Material  Total   
Steel 3   
Event Total Fatalities 
Number of Crew on 
Vessel Cause 
Asphyxiation  1 2 Freon 
Fall from Dock 1 Unknown Alcohol 
Vessel Disaster  1 4 Overloading 
 
 29 
3.2 Non-Fatal Events  
3.2.1 Overview  
Between 2000 and 2009, the NIOSH Alaska Pacific Office reported that there 
were 21 tender vessel casualties that did not end in fatalities. The average vessel year-
built was 1963 with a range from 1920 to 1998 (Table 2). The average crew size was 3 
with a range from 1 to 6 individuals, and the average length was 81 feet, with a range of 
50 to 165 feet (Table 2). Eighteen of these vessels were operating as salmon tenders, 1 
was tendering herring, 1 vessel was fishing for sea cucumbers and transporting their catch 
and the catches of others to town,1 and the operations of one vessel are unknown (Table 
2).  
 Ten of the tenders involved in non-fatal events were made of steel, 8 were made 
of wood, and 3 were made of fiberglass (Fig. 1).  
 
Table 2. A description of all vessels involved in non-fatal  
events on tenders ≥ 50 feet in length between 2000 and 
2009 in the 17th Coast Guard District. Based on data 
received from the NIOSH APO.  
 
 
1 This instance of “tendering” is different from the classic definition of a tender vessel. While they may 
have been tendering cucumbers in a broad sense, the activities aboard this vessel were not typical of the 
tenders in the Alaska Independent Tendermans Association (AITA).  
Vessel 
Description Average Range 
Length (feet) 81 50  -  165 
Crew Size 3 1 - 6  
Year Built 1963 1920 - 1998 
Types Salmon (18), Herring (1), 
Cucumber (1), and Unknown 
(1) 
  
Figure 1. Vessel hull material of tenders involved 
in non-fatal events between 2000 and 2009. 
Based on data received from the NIOSH APO. 
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3.2.2 Events  
Striking rocks or the ocean floor was the most common occurrence in the non-
fatal events and accounted for 8 out of 21 (≈38%) accidents. The second most common 
incident was fire or explosion, accounting for 5 (≈24%) events, while 4 (≈19%) vessels 
experienced flooding. Less predominant causes of non-fatal events included 
collision/allision (3 vessels, or about 14%) and being struck by a large wave (1 vessel, or 
about 5%) (Fig. 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Events resulting in a non-fatal tender accident between 2000 and 
2009. Based on data received from the NIOSH APO. 
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 3.2.3 Human Error 
 Only 12 of the 21 non-fatal tender 
accidents reported a human error. Of these 
12, 7 (≈58%) reported a human error of 
falling asleep at the helm, 3 (25%) reported 
drug use, and 2 (≈17%) reported a 
navigational error (Fig. 3).  
 
 
 
3.2.4 Human Error and Resulting Event  
 In 5 out of 12 (≈42%) human errors, the operator fell asleep at the helm and 
struck rocks or the ocean floor. The 3 instances of drug use (25%) also led to the vessel 
striking rocks or bottom, as did 1 navigational error (≈17%). There were also 2 events 
(≈17%) where the operator fell asleep at the helm, which resulted in a collision or allision 
event (Fig. 4). Therefore, all of the reported human error events resulted in the vessel 
striking something, causing boat damage.   
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 4. Reported human error and the subsequent event aboard tender vessels 
   between 2000 and 2009. Based on data received from the NIOSH APO. 
Figure 3. Human error resulting in non-fatal tender accidents 
in Alaska between 2000 and 2009. Based on data received 
from the NIOSH APO. 
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3.3 Current Tender Operations and Expenses  
3.3.1 Tender Dimensions and Operations 
Thirty-two tenders across Alaska generously provided information regarding their 
current expenses and practices. These vessels had an average year-built of 1956, with a 
median of 1946 and a range of 1918 to 1987 (Table 3). The average vessel length was 
89.2 feet, with a median of 83.5 feet and a range of 54 to 124.6 feet. Also, the average 
maximum crew size was 4.6 individuals with a median of 4 and a range of 3 to 8 people 
(Table 3).  
The majority of vessels were made of steel (20, or 62.5%), while 11 (34.4%) were 
made of wood, and 1 was made of fiberglass (3.1%) (Table 3). 
These tenders spent an average of about 89 percent of their total yearly operations 
tendering, with 99 percent as the median time. The most common reported percentage for 
this variable was 100, and values ranged from 25 to 100 percent (Fig. 5).  
 
Table 3. Reported data from 32 current tenders regarding vessel dimensions and  
materials (2013). Based on data received from AITA.  
Vessel Description Average Median Range 
Length (feet) 89.2 83.5 54 - 124.6 
Maximum Crew Size 4.6 4 3 - 8  
Year Built 1956 1946 1918 - 1987 
Vessel Hull Material  Total 
Steel 20 
 Wood 11 
Fiberglass 1 
 
 
 33 
Number of Vessels and Time Spent Tendering
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
25 40 55 70 85 More
Percentage of Year Tendering
 
 
Tender operators also reported other uses for their vessels, including commercial 
fishing, hauling freight, and surveys.2 Nine out of 32 tenders reported fishing 
commercially. These 9 tenders spent an average of 35 percent of their time commercial 
fishing, with a median of 10 percent. Additionally, 8 out of 32 tenders reported hauling 
freight throughout the year, with an average time spent hauling freight of 7.8 percent and 
median time of 5 percent. One tender reported spending 2 percent of their year 
completing surveys (Table 4).    
                          Table 4. Average time spent by tenders on other activities as reported by 32 
             AITA tenders in 2013. 100% equals the full year. Based on data received  
                         from AITA.  
Activity Number of Vessels  
Average 
Time (%) 
Median 
Time (%)  
Commercial Fishing   9 35 10 
Hauling Freight 8 7.8 5 
Surveys 1 2 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
           Figure 5. Reported time spent tendering of tender 
                         vessels in Alaska in 2013 (100%=total operational time,  
                                       n=32) (25=0-25%, 40=26-40%, more=86% or more, etc.).  
          Based on data received from AITA.  
 
2 A survey is generally when a company or agency charters the vessel to do research. Fish and wildlife 
agencies often do this to learn about sea life populations to accurately set fishing quotas for the coming 
year (Duz, 2014).  
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3.3.2 Income and Expenses 
 Twenty-seven vessels reported their gross income from tendering operations. 
They reported an average of $258,777 and a median of $250,000. These gross incomes 
ranged from $21,000 to $600,000 (Table 5).  
 Thirty vessels also reported their annual maintenance budget.3 Of these vessels, 
the average budget was approximately $51,200, with a median of $50,000 and a range of 
$15,000 to $120,000 (Table 5).  
    Table 5. Reported gross incomes from tendering operations (n=27) and annual 
    maintenance budgets (n=30) of current tender vessels in Alaska (in dollars). Based  
    on data received from AITA. 
 Average Median Range 
Gross Income  258,777 250,000 21,000 - 600,000 
Maintenance Budget 51,200 50,000 15,000 - 120,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Some vessels reported a range of values. In these cases, the average of the values was used to compute the 
average and median. For example, if a vessel reported a maintenance budget of $30,000 to $50,000, 
$40,000 was used to compute the averages.   
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
The deaths and vessel casualties aboard tenders arose from many different 
problems, and this chapter proposes individual solutions for each type of casualty 
category. First, solutions and potential regulation for the fatal events are proposed, 
followed by the non-fatal events, taking into consideration the AITA survey data 
completed by individuals in the fleet. The AITA data (Section 3.3) indicate that most 
tenders spend the vast majority of their year tendering, and also that their incomes (and 
associated maintenance budgets) from these operations are usually quite limited. This 
means that the economic burden of each regulation was assessed before the regulation 
was recommended in this report.   
Finally, the current Alternative Compliance and Safety Agreement implemented 
in the catcher/processor fleet is reviewed, taking into consideration the feasibility and 
usefulness of this regulation as it relates to the tender fleet. Ultimately, the events and 
accidents experienced by tenders are very different from other fleets, and the proposed 
solutions therefore reflect the individualistic nature of the issues at hand.  
Throughout this entire analysis, it is important to remember the financial situation 
of most tender operators. While tenders and regulators understand that safety is a primary 
goal, regulation that puts many tenders out of business should also be a primary concern. 
Since tender vessels are usually older vessels that have been repurposed for tendering, 
they are generally already in poorer condition than vessels in other fleets. The new 
alternative regulations should therefore find a balance between increasing safety and 
allowing operations to continue despite minor hazards.  
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Additionally, the alternative compliance measures should not be subjective 
measures in which a member of the Coast Guard dictates what they feel is best in a 
specific instance, but an objective system that tenders can budget for year by year. This 
will help tenders allocate time and money to certain projects without being surprised by 
new, expensive repairs at inconvenient times. An untimely and unexpected repair could 
easily cost a tender operator more than their business is worth, and it is therefore 
important that regulators and the writers of regulation adhere to a structured, predictable, 
step-by-step plan that all tenders can allocate resources towards. This will greatly reduce 
the potential for economically devastating impacts of the new regulation.  
  
4.1 Fatal Events   
Between 2000 and 2012, there were only 3 reported deaths aboard tender vessels 
in Alaska. This number is relatively low, considering that there were 107 total deaths 
aboard fishing industry vessels in Alaska between 2000 and 2009 (Lincoln & Lucas, 
2011). Also between 2000 and 2009, the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands (BSAI) fleet 
experienced 12 fatalities and the Alaska salmon industry experienced 39 fatalities 
(Lincoln & Lucas, 2011). While other fleets, such as the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands 
(BSAI) crab fleet, have already undergone substantial changes in their safety policies 
because of their very high death rates, the relatively infrequent deaths in the tender fleet 
have helped slow the charge toward alternative regulation. Yet alternative regulation is 
imminent, and the new regulations should therefore reflect the real threats in this unique 
segment of the industry. It is important to remember that these deaths were preventable, 
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and simple, cost-efficient measures should be taken to significantly reduce these risks in 
the future.  
 
4.1.1 Freon™ Exposure 
 Freon™ is a type of refrigerant used aboard most tender vessels to keep fish cold 
during their journey from the fishing vessel to the processing plant. Freon™ is a 
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) trademarked by DuPont that comes in many molecular 
structures, the most common of which aboard fishing industry vessels is currently R-22 
(Chlorodifluoromethane) (Duz, 2014).4 Freon™ is a heavy gas that displaces oxygen 
when it enters a space, leading to heart arrhythmia or asphyxiation if an individual 
remains in the contaminated area. Unfortunately, death due to Freon™ exposure can 
happen in many different industrial workplaces, often when an individual enters a 
confined space without proper protection or without knowing that the area is 
contaminated. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported 12 deaths in the 1980s due 
to Freon™ exposure on land (Miller, 1989), and this refrigerant is a persistent threat in 
the fishing and fish processing industries (Duz, 2013). 
 In the AITA survey, 27 out of 32 vessels reported using some type of Freon™ and 
only one reported using ammonia. Although Freon™ can be lethal, simple measures can 
be taken to significantly reduce the risk of harmful exposure. Freon™ detectors can be 
installed in at-risk areas with a readout panel in a remote location to warn employees and 
operators when there is a dangerous leak. These devices can be installed for $600 to $900 
4 Although DuPont has trademarked Freon™, other companies manufacture refrigerants with the same 
molecular formula and market them under different names. Freon™ is used in this report for readability 
and because it is the nickname for all of these types of refrigerants in the industry.  
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per sensor, and the readout panels cost around $1,300 (Duz, 2013). Compared to other 
repairs and expenses, these detectors are quite affordable, and they are a very effective 
way of reducing the risk of Freon™ exposure.   
Although many tenders may not have these detectors already installed, the 
detectors are a simple solution to a deadly threat. Freon™ exposure is a serious issue in 
many industrial workplaces, and the risk of death should therefore be taken seriously. 
Freon™ detectors aboard tender vessels will surely prevent future deaths, and they should 
be required in all tenders that use Freon™ as a refrigerant.  
 
4.1.2 Fall from Dock, Intoxication  
 One individual in this study died because they fell from the dock, intoxicated by 
alcohol. Unfortunately, regulating alcohol consumption by commercial and recreational 
fishermen is an extremely complex topic and cannot be adequately addressed in this 
report. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (and in some cases 
state occupational safety and health agencies) generally regulates safety on docks. 
However, alcohol consumption usually occurs during non-working hours and is thus 
outside the scope of occupational safety regulators’ enforcement. Proposing specific 
regulations for the tender fleet related to incidents of this type is therefore unproductive, 
as the nature of this death is beyond the scope of this analysis.  
 
4.1.3 Overloading 
 Overloading, which resulted in one death in this study, is another preventable 
issue. Overloading occurs when a vessel carries too much weight or carries too much 
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weight above the waterline, which destabilizes the vessel and significantly increases the 
risk of capsizing and downflooding. These events are usually a result of a human error 
when an operator makes poor decisions and knowingly destabilizes the vessel. Thus, the 
most important and useful way to avoid overloading is to limit unwise management 
decisions made by operators. However, other measures may also be taken to reduce the 
risk of overloading and encourage safe practices. Some of these potential regulations are 
described below, but it is important to keep in mind that the best decisions will involve 
the ideas and efforts of many parties.  
In other fishing fleets, vessels are required to undergo stability analyses, in which 
an outside party calculates the amount that the vessel can safely load onto their vessel 
without significantly increasing the risk of capsizing. However, these stability tests are 
extremely expensive. A single test can cost $25,000, which is almost half of the average 
yearly maintenance budget as reported by AITA tenders. While 20 out of 32 vessels in 
the AITA survey reported having completed a roll or stability test, more than half of 
those tests occurred before 1991. Usually, new stability tests are required whenever a 
vessel undergoes a significant modification, and since some tenders have made 
significant changes to their vessel, many existing stability tests are likely inapplicable 
now. Thus, even though about two-thirds of reporting tenders have completed a stability 
analysis at some point in the past, most will need to complete new one, and many current 
owners will not be able to do so because of the test’s associated economic burden.  
Putting tenders out of business as a result of requiring stability tests would be 
detrimental to both the tender fleet and those who depend on tenders for their services 
(including fishing vessels and processors). Therefore, if the Coast Guard decides that 
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some type of stability test is necessary, it should seek to create an alternative to the 
traditional stability test. This test should be cost-effective, and it should provide some 
leniency in operations for tenders. It may prescribe how much a tender vessel can load on 
board, but it should not require the full mathematical analysis required for other fleets. 
Rather than being an extremely rigid, strict system, the analysis should leave some room 
for operations to continue despite small hazards on vessels.  
It is also important that the requirements are implemented over a long time period 
to allow tenders to adjust to the new regulations. Implementing a stability test in a matter 
of two years (a very short time frame) would cause unnecessary burden on tenders, and 
this burden is unwarranted because of the relatively few instances of overloading 
disasters aboard the vessels. Although some sort of stability test may be inevitable, the 
test’s design should take into account the economic challenges faced by the fleet.  
 Another alternative to a traditional stability tests might be regulation that dictates 
where tender vessels can operate without a stability test. One of the longest and most 
dangerous voyages that tenders undergo is the trip across the Gulf of Alaska, a large body 
of water near the southeast corner of the state (Duz, 2014). This is an especially 
dangerous crossing because of its length and exposure, as other vessels may not be 
available to come to the rescue if problems arise.  
 Regulating tender voyages across this body of water may help reduce the risks 
associated with overloading, and there are many options for increasing safety here 
without requiring costly tests and analyses. First, the Coast Guard could require tenders 
without a current stability report to make this crossing without loads on deck, thus 
improving stability. Alternatively, they could require tenders to either make this crossing 
 41 
simultaneously with another vessel or operate within a designated distance from shore. 
These measures might allow tenders to continue to operate in safer, more protected 
waters without costly regulation. Of course, dangerous waters are still a serious threat 
along shorelines and a vessel may still encounter trouble in these areas, but the increased 
protection, as well the closer proximity to rescue personnel, make coastlines somewhat 
safer for voyages. 
 The Coast Guard could enforce these rules by accessing a vessel’s Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), which tracks the vessel and allows others to view its 
location. Since all tender vessels either already have AIS systems or will be required to 
use them in the near future (Lee, 2014), this would not be an added cost to tender 
operators, making this type of regulation both effective and cost-efficient.   
 Again, while the suggestions described above may help avoid overloading 
disasters, the most important factor in these accidents is the human factor. The ultimate 
solution to avoiding overloading casualties and fatalities is proper decision making on 
behalf of the operator, and their knowledge and experience is key. Even though solutions 
with a price tag are often appealing when forming regulation, it is important to remember 
that the operator is truly the most important variable when analyzing these issues.  
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4.2 Non-Fatal Events  
 The hurdles experienced by the Alaskan tender fleet are much different than those 
of the entire fishing vessel population. Data of all non-fatal vessel losses in Alaska and 
the West Coast between 2000 and 2010 indicate that 6 out of 129  (27%) of the disasters 
that led to non-fatal events aboard Alaskan fishing vessels were a result of being struck 
by a wave (Lincoln et al., 2012), whereas only 1 (5%) of the vessels in the non-fatal 
events for tenders occurred because a vessel was struck by a wave (Fig. 2). Similarly, 
instability was a factor in 11 out of 129 (9%) non-fatal events in Alaska fisheries at large 
(Lincoln et al.), whereas this was not a factor in non-fatal events on tenders. Finally, 35 
out of 126 (27%) non-fatal events on fishing vessels occurred because the vessel struck 
bottom or rocks (Lincoln et al.), whereas this occurred in 8 out of 21 (38%) events aboard 
tenders.  
Thus, it is clear that tenders require specific regulations that will help mitigate 
issues that pertain directly to this fleet. Applying the current ACSA program or the 
regulations that are used in the BSAI crabbing fleet would be ineffective and fiscally 
burdensome for tender operators, and the subsequent sections seek to propose realistic 
and helpful solutions to the issues faced by tender vessels. Solutions for each type of 
vessel casualty are discussed individually (striking rocks/ocean floor, fires/explosions, 
flooding, collision/allision, and struck by large wave), as well as the human errors that 
resulted in casualties (falling asleep, drug use, and navigational error). 
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4.2.1 Striking Rocks or the Ocean Floor  
The largest proportion of vessel accidents occurred because a vessel struck rocks 
or the bottom of the sea floor (8 out of 21, or 38%). These types of incidents are usually 
due to human error, and solutions to these issues are proposed in the Human Error 
section on page 50 under Falling Asleep At Helm.  
 
4.2.2 Fire and Explosion 
The second most common type of vessel casualty was fire or explosion, 
accounting for 5 out of 21 (≈24%) events. These serious events often exhibit warning 
signs before occurring, and although the data in this report do not show the cause of these 
incidents, fires and explosions are often due to human errors of neglect and poor 
maintenance, which generally have simple solutions.  
The Coast Guard could therefore implement simple, cost-effective regulations that 
should mitigate the risk of fires and explosions aboard vessels. These requirements may 
include an annual inspection of the sleeving on fuel hoses, hydraulic hoses, and fittings 
on these hoses to reduce the risk of fire. The regulation may also require proper storage 
of flammable materials, (for example, away from the engine) the use of metal flooring on 
steel vessels (as opposed to wood, which ignites easily, especially when soaked with oil), 
and/or a visual inspection of electrical wiring and equipment. Evidently, these are all 
general maintenance procedures that necessitate proper attention. 
Additionally, most tenders must already undergo periodic surveys as required by 
their insurer. This means that the vessels are already being inspected for some issues, and 
requiring additional inspections would be feasible. Twenty-six out of 32 tenders in the 
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AITA questionnaire replied that their insurer required periodic surveys, while only 6 
responded that surveys were not required. Most of the tenders were required to complete 
a survey every 2 to 4 years, with a range of frequency from 1 to 5 years. While an 
inspection every 5 years may be insufficient, tenders are already accustomed to the 
process, and regulators should therefore consider implementing additional inspections or 
broadening the scope of the current inspections to reduce fire and explosion risks.   
Although fires and explosions can likely be avoided by paying attention to general 
maintenance without serious financial burden, extra measures may be necessary if these 
options prove inadequate. Subsequent regulation could require some crewmembers or 
operators to participate in basic fire prevention and fire fighting classes to enhance fire 
safety knowledge, and these classes would be a relatively inexpensive solution. While 
these classes are often helpful, it will also be important to specify who must be trained, 
because it would likely be impractical to require every member aboard the vessel to 
complete a training course. As with other fishing fleets, many crewmembers arrive in the 
summer from far away to work. They usually do not have time to participate in a fire 
safety class before boarding a vessel, and the classes are often not offered near their 
hometown or at necessary times. Thus, requiring every member aboard the vessel to 
complete a course would place a logistical and economic burden on the tender. It may be 
more feasible, then, to require certain key operators or managers to complete a course so 
that their knowledge can be applied to the vessel. Therefore, while fire safety classes 
could be a helpful solution to tenders’ issues, it would be important to specify who must 
complete the training. 
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More advanced systems are also available if fires persist. Fixed systems, which 
generally put out a fire in a closed space by filling the room with a gas or chemical 
extinguishing agent, are a more sophisticated type of fire fighting equipment that require 
airtight spaces to be effective (United States Department of Labor, 2014). Indeed, some 
tenders have already implemented this technology. In the AITA survey, half (16) of 
tenders reported having fixed fire systems.  
However, fixed systems have serious drawbacks, and since installing a fixed 
system can cost an operator thousands of dollars, other regulatory standards should be 
implemented before resorting to these measures. When a fixed system is activated, the 
entire vessel must be shut down without power for hours, leaving it adrift in the ocean 
until the engine room may be safely accessed again, posing new hazards to the vessel and 
crew. Furthermore, fixed systems may not be effective when a fire occurs. Ultimately, 
these systems should not be the first line of defense in fire prevention or fire fighting 
aboard tender vessels. Smaller preventive actions, such as routine maintenance 
procedures and the use of appropriate construction materials, are generally much more 
effective.  
Thus, the Coast Guard should implement a compliance checklist for tenders to 
follow to reduce their risk of fires and explosions. The associated inspection should be at 
clear time intervals with very little room for inspector interpretation or subjectivity, and if 
the vessel does not comply with the checklist they should be given time to perform the 
maintenance to bring them into compliance. If this type of regulation is not effective in 
reducing fires and explosions after multiple years, the Coast Guard and operators could 
consider extra measures such as additional fire prevention courses, fire fighting training, 
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or the installation of fixed systems. In general, however, many fire prevention strategies 
are not very costly, and both tender operators and regulatory agencies should consider 
implementing simple solutions as a way to significantly limit vessel casualties in a cost-
efficient manner.    
 
4.2.3 Flooding  
 Four out of 21 (≈19%) tender vessel casualties involved flooding. While flooding 
can have disastrous consequences for both the vessel and those aboard, there are many 
simple steps that owners and operators can take to significantly reduce their chances of 
experiencing a flooding event. Similar to the previous section on fires and explosions, the 
Coast Guard could effectively use a checklist of general maintenance procedures to 
increase vessel safety.  
 Tender vessels generally flood as a result of downflooding, in which an initiating 
event, such as a failed watertight hatch, a rogue wave, or improper through hull fittings 
leads to water entering one or more of the ships compartments (Duz, 2014). Water from 
that flooded area then enters other spaces on the vessel, ultimately leading to a large 
flooding disaster. Luckily, there are simple, routine maintenance procedures that can help 
reduce the risk of flooding. The Coast Guard, along with other involved parties, should 
therefore formulate a checklist much like the one proposed for the Fires and Explosions 
section (Section 4.2.2). This checklist would include inspecting the vessel’s hull materials 
for watertight integrity, and it should also ensure that fittings are not corroded and safe 
for use. Again, this checklist should be an objective list that tenders can follow year by 
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year, and it should also have steps to be implemented over a substantial period of time 
(multiple years) to reduce financial burden.  
 Since tenders are often older vessels converted from previous fishing boats, they 
may use something called a “doubler” to reinforce the hull of their vessel, which may 
also pose a flood risk. A doubler is often installed when a piece of steel on the hull of the 
vessel becomes rotten and weak. Instead of replacing the steel with a new piece, some 
operators layer a piece of steel on top of the old one to enhance the hull. In general, this is 
not the safest solution to these issues, but it is much more cost-effective for operators 
who may be under financial stress. In the AITA survey, there were 20 steel tender 
vessels. Of those boats, 11 reported using doublers. When polled about what percentage 
of their hull was covered in doublers, values varied greatly, ranging from 1 percent to 80 
percent.  
Replacing these doublers with new hull plating would be extremely expensive. 
Seattle shipyards typically charge $2,000 to repair a small 12 inch by 12 inch section, and 
a full sheet of steel may cost as much as $50,000 to replace (Duz, 2014). The prices vary 
greatly based on the location and condition of the vessel structural members, too. For 
example, if fuel tanks must be gas freed,5 or if equipment must be removed and 
reinstalled, prices increase. These potential repairs have very high costs that would likely 
put many tenders out of business, considering that the median annual maintenance budget 
for tenders is about $50,000.  Yet some regulators might suggest that tenders replace their 
doublers to reduce their chances of flooding. However, the casualty data do not show that 
5 Before performing repairs around or near a confined space, especially a fuel tank, the space must be 
cleared of all combustible gases and liquids. These procedures become very expensive rather quickly, as 
the tanks are usually drained, cleaned, and then filled with an inert gas so that the welder does not cause an 
explosion.  
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tenders need to undergo such an expensive process, as there were no cases of doubler 
failure reported in the data of tender casualties. Simpler maintenance may be just as 
beneficial.  
Thus, similar to the issues posed in the Fires and Explosions section, simple, cost-
effective measures should help decrease the number of vessel casualties aboard tenders, 
and these issues should therefore be given first priority. Furthermore, expensive repairs, 
such as replacing doublers, would be cost prohibitive for many operators and the expense 
would place an undue burden on the fleet. Thus, there are many solutions to the problems 
faced by tenders that will allow vessels to increase safety and also continue operations, 
and those solutions should be the primary interest of regulators and operators.  
 
4.2.4 Collision and Allision 
 There were 3 vessels (≈14%) that experienced collision or allision (an instance 
where one vessel strikes a fixed object) events. Collision and allision often arise due to 
the same issues in the Striking Rocks or Ocean Floor and Navigational Errors sections, 
and the same solutions are therefore proposed. These suggestions can be found in the 
Human Error section  (Section 4.3.1) under Falling Asleep at the Helm on page 50 and 
the Navigational Error section (Section 4.3.3) on page 54. Solutions that keep 
watchpeople awake and alert and solutions that enhance navigational knowledge are 
likely the same solutions that would help reduce these collision and allision events, and 
they should therefore be strongly considered to prevent tender accidents in the future.  
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4.2.5 Struck by Wave 
 There was one instance in this report where a vessel was struck by a large wave. 
While this may be considered a “freak accident” and there may not be a realistic, helpful 
solution to addressing this isolated incident, there are simple measures that vessels can 
take to reduce their risk of harm if they were to be struck by a wave. These solutions have 
already been discussed in this report, and they are discussed in more depth in the 
Overloading subsection (Section 4.1.3) of the Fatal Events section on page 39. While 
these solutions may not have helped this particular incident of being struck by a wave, 
they nevertheless would increase tender vessel safety and would be realistic solutions to 
the pervading problems at hand.  
  
4.3 Human Error  
4.3.1 Falling Asleep at the Helm 
Falling asleep at the helm was the most commonly reported human error (7 out of 
12 instances). These errors resulted in the vessel either striking rocks or the bottom (5 out 
of 7) or a collision or allision event (2 out of 7). Therefore, to prevent many of the non-
fatal events that occur, finding a way to keep individuals alert and awake at the helm 
would be a very advantageous solution. Generally, operators in the tender fleet are 
especially susceptible to falling asleep at the helm because of the long hours and limited 
staff on board. Tenders often spend all day and night receiving fish deliveries and 
traveling from one location to the next, and when the crew size is small (2-3 individuals), 
the long, monotonous hours and rolling seas can lull even the most caffeinated individual 
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to sleep. Luckily, there are many cost-effective solutions to keep tender operators awake 
at the helm. 
Watch alarms, also called bridge alarms or bridge navigational watch alarm 
systems, are one of the most effective ways to ensure that operators remain alert. These 
inexpensive pieces of equipment generally display a local signal (often in the form of a 
flashing light) at designated time intervals where the operator is located. The operator 
must then switch off the alarm, usually by pressing a button or moving his arm in front of 
the sensor, indicating that he or she is alert and awake. If he or she does not switch the 
alarm off, however, a louder alarm will sound, waking him and/or other vessel 
employees. Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), an international maritime safety treaty to 
ensure basic vessel safety, recently required that watch alarms be used in passenger and 
cargo ships (with a phase-in period ending in 2018) to address similar issues aboard 
different vessels (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013). While the price of these systems varies, 
they generally cost about two thousand dollars for the equipment, which is a relatively 
low cost for the longevity and utility of these safety systems.  
Yet tenders do not frequently report using watch alarms. In the AITA survey, only 
5 out of 32 vessels reported using such systems, a surprisingly low number for the issues 
that they prevent. Because the data show that tender watchstanders are falling asleep at 
the helm, mandating the installation and use of watch alarms would be an advantageous 
solution for tenders. Additionally, it may be beneficial to require these alarms to be 
linked to the vessel’s autopilot and general alarm systems. Since the risk of falling asleep 
is the greatest when the vessel is running on autopilot, keeping tender operators awake 
during this critical time would minimize the instances of needless accidents. Further, 
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connecting the alarm to the general alarm system would help notify all other 
crewmembers of potential emergencies before they have serious consequences.  
Since striking rocks or the ocean floor accounted for the largest proportion of all 
vessel disasters (35%), and of the recorded human errors, falling asleep accounted for 
over half (≈58%) of these striking-rock incidents (and also all of the collision events), 
keeping tender operators from falling asleep would likely be one of the most effective 
solutions to reducing vessel casualties in the tender fleet. The tender fleet and USCG 
should seriously consider requiring the use of watch alarms to help mitigate tender 
disasters, especially because they are very cost-effective. 
 
4.3.2 Drug Use 
 Drug use accounted for 3 out of 12 (25%) reported human errors, and all 3 
instances resulted in the vessel striking rocks or the ocean floor.  
 Unfortunately, the data studied in this thesis are insufficient to reach a conclusion 
and propose solutions for reducing errors related to drug use, and the nature of tenders 
exacerbates this challenge. The data do not distinguish between types of drugs used, 
including the distinctions between illegal substance abuse and alcohol consumption, 
which would be an important differentiation to make when proposing drug-related 
regulation. Additionally, tenders face other logistical challenges, including a limited 
number of employees onboard and lack of administrative oversight or support. This 
suggests that proposing drug use regulation, even if this data better described the 
incidents, would be a great logistical challenge. Essentially, the shortcomings of the data 
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set and realities of tendering make any potential regulation an ineffective use of 
resources, and other methods would likely be more beneficial.  
It would be much more advantageous to enforce more realistic measures, such as 
requiring watch duties to be performed with an effective watch alarm. Watch alarms, 
which keep an individual alert and notify others if that individual has failed to do their 
duty, will likely significantly reduce the risk of the most common type of incidents that 
tenders face. The limited knowledge we have of drug use aboard vessels and the 
logistical challenges associated with tenders makes the aforementioned solutions the most 
effective.  
 
4.3.3 Navigational Error 
 There were 2 instances (≈16% of the total human errors) of navigational errors in 
this data set, both of which led to the vessel striking rocks or bottom. This is a much less 
predominate type of human error in the fleet, but simple measures can be taken to reduce 
the risk of navigational errors. For instance, the USCG could require some operators or 
watchmen to complete navigational classes to increase their knowledge of general 
operational procedures and navigation techniques. Similar to the discussion on 
firefighting and fire prevention classes on page 45, it would not be feasible to require all 
employees aboard a tender vessel to complete courses in navigation because of their 
temporary employment and place of residence. However, it is important that at least some 
members of the crew have a thorough understanding of proper navigational practices. If 
some operators have completed a course and are competent in their skills, it would be 
beneficial for them to train other individuals on the vessel to increase general safety. 
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Navigational errors were only reported twice in this data set, but navigational classes for 
some specific employees would be a simple, effective solution to reducing these errors.  
   
4.4 Current Alternative Compliance and Safety Agreement  
 The current Alternative Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA), used by the 
catcher/processor (C/P) fleet, is a lengthy document with many requirements. While 
some of the regulations may be helpful for increasing safety and staff competency, many 
of the measures are very expensive and would not adequately address the issues faced by 
the tender fleet as identified in this data set. It would therefore be very ineffective and 
foolish to simply implement this program in the tender fleet. 
 Applying the current ACSA to tenders would put many operators out of business. 
The catcher/processor fleet has a much greater income than the tender fleet (Duz, 2013), 
and C/P vessels and owners can therefore afford to make many of the changes required 
by the agreement. In order for tenders to remain in business, however, they must be 
allowed to use the least extensive changes necessary for safety, yet ACSA often calls for 
the most comprehensive maintenance procedures. This would impose an insurmountable 
financial burden without much benefit.  
Furthermore, ACSA would not even address many of the issues faced by tenders. 
One of the predominant causes of vessel casualties in this data set was hitting rocks or the 
ocean’s floor. The expensive maintenance required by ACSA would do little to address 
this issue, and the problems should therefore be solved with more effective, affordable 
solutions. The regulations proposed in this chapter would be more worthwhile for all 
involved parties, and regulators should therefore look towards a different type of 
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alternative regulation for the tender fleet rather than modifying the current ACSA 
document.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
While this analysis lays a foundation for the future regulation of the tender fleet, 
the best regulations will arise out of a collaborative process between operators, owners, 
captains, regulators, inspectors, safety experts, and other individuals with a connection to 
the tender segment of the fishing industry. The regulations proposed in this thesis should 
therefore be understood as recommendations or a starting point for a discussion, with an 
understanding that the actual compliance agreement should be reached through a much 
greater dialogue between various parties.  
However, this report’s findings do lead to some important conclusions concerning 
the direction of the new regulation. After analyzing the data, communicating with 
regulators, safety experts, and tendermen, and reading websites, books, and legal 
documents, it remains abundantly clear that the current ACSA would not be an 
advantageous solution to the problems that tenders face. In many cases, it would ruin 
individuals’ businesses and destroy family incomes, and it would be much more 
beneficial to implement simpler, more cost-effective measures that focus on alleviating 
the actual risks that have been documented in this report. In general, these new 
regulations should keep in mind a few main issues, including:  
1. The limited income of tenders. Tenders have a very limited gross income and 
maintenance budget when compared to other fleets. Regulators should therefore 
consider the cost of any potential regulation,  
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2. The timetable in which maintenance is required. Regulations should have a clear, 
objective timetable of repairs and maintenance to perform. This will allow tenders 
to budget for maintenance expenses with minimal surprise, and,  
3. The objectivity of inspections and maintenance procedures. Inspectors and 
regulators must remain objective when carrying out inspections. Regulations 
should not be subject to change based on an individual inspector’s opinions, 
which could create unforeseen financial burdens for operators.  
 
In addition to these general considerations, and based on the data of past tender 
casualties, the following specific regulations are proposed as a starting point to 
increase worker and vessel safety aboard tenders in the United States while also 
allowing most tenders to continue operations. The solutions are arranged from less 
expensive to more expensive, but they should all be considered to address the 
accidents that tenders have already experienced. The potential regulations include: 
1. An alternative regulation to the stability test, which might include one or more 
of the following: Requiring vessels without a current stability report to 
make long crossings in pairs and/or stay within a designated distance 
from shore and/or make crossings without loads on deck, especially when 
crossing the Gulf of Alaska.  
2. Install watch alarms that are linked to both the vessel’s autopilot and general 
alarm systems, 
3. Require some vessel operators to complete a navigational course before 
operating the vessel, 
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4. Create a routine compliance checklist to ensure that the vessel is not at risk 
of fires and explosions (to be carried out at designated intervals by a surveyor 
or an individual from the United States Coast Guard),  
5. Create a routine compliance checklist to ensure that the vessel is not at risk 
of flooding (to be carried out at designated intervals by a surveyor or an 
individual from the United States Coast Guard), and, 
6. Install refrigerant leak detectors in spaces that have refrigeration equipment.  
 
 Expensive repairs and maintenance, such as replacing doublers or installing fixed 
firefighting systems, would be financially burdensome for most, if not all, tenders. 
Therefore, the less expensive compliance measures should be implemented first and 
given time to take effect. If the initial proposed regulations do not adequately address 
tendermen’s issues and the same problems persist, then other measures may be 
considered.  
 Lastly, it is important to remember that tendermen can spend large sums of money  
on expensive and time consuming repairs, but unless the small, simple issues are 
addressed (such as keeping operators awake at the helm), progress toward safer 
operations will ultimately be slow, if not impossible. The greatest return on any 
investments in tender vessel safety will come from the small, operational changes that are 
implemented, which will both keep tenders in business and maximize their safety at sea. 
It is therefore of the utmost importance that operators, regulators, and other involved 
parties work together toward an effective, objective, and cost-efficient regulatory plan for 
tenders, ensuring that the regulations are the best course of action for all involved parties. 
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